The wall of separation between religion and politics erected and sustained by classical liberalism perpetuates the notion that religious belief is discriminatory, intolerant, and at times fanatical, and as such is unable to participate in the public realm. Ronald Thiemann, in a variety of contexts, confronts the presumption that one’s personal beliefs cannot and should not serve as resources for one’s public policy. The fundamental challenge brought by Thiemann undermines the present reasoning behind the separation of religion and politics in the public realm which suggests that an individual forfeit moral convictions and religious persuasions in public engagements due to their fundamental non-negotiable nature. In fact, Thiemann states, “there is nothing inherent in religious belief or in communities of faith that should preclude them from participating fully in the persuasive forum of democratic politics”(1:135). If we accept this as true, and Thiemann makes a compelling argument for why we should, we must investigate how this would happen and what it would like in both theological and theoretical terms.
One of the primary contentions Thiemann makes which contributes to a fuller and more robust defence of public religion, and which is admittedly a persuasive one even for the most earnest of secularists, is that religion can contribute to “political vitality”(2:76) in a manner which is supportive of, rather than detrimental to, the unavoidable reality of pluralism. In both his theological and theoretical works, Thiemann pursues and advances the notion that the enrichment of public life and any feasible defence of democracy and its institutions rests on the nurturing of “communities of virtue”(2:73) and public voices of faith, whose inherent commitment to the virtues of democracy and employment of transcendent ideals will “elevate the understanding of democratic values themselves”(2:85). In this piece, I intend to trace a variety of Thiemann’s arguments, theological and theoretical, which illustrate and buttress the contention that religion is not only a “blessing”, but an imperative, for a thriving democracy. I pay particular attention to how Thiemann suggests religion may revitalize civic responsibility, participation, and integrity through the deprivatization of religion.
To begin, we must establish the context within which Thiemann makes his controversial claim; that is, he advances his argument based on contradicting evidence that on one hand, America demonstrates significantly high levels of religiosity, and on the other hand, attempts to strictly uphold a concept of separation deemed necessary for the protection of individual liberties in a pluralistic democracy (1:3). This is the dilemma. Should religion play no role in the public lives of predominantly religious people? This unresolved tension, Thiemann contests, continues to yield “incoherent decisions and contradictory policies” (1:16).
This incoherency that we are battling is a residual obstacle lingering from Reformationist and classical liberal anxiety over the problematic relationship between ecclesiastical and political authorities. This unease stems from the logic that religious claims are of an irresolvable nature and hence the public arena must only accept claims of universal applicability and that moral prerogatives be privatized. The founding documents of the United States, the First Amendment particularly, address this concern and attempt to protect religious freedom and to limit the establishment or dominance of any one particular religion. Thiemann disputes the idealization of privatization and neutrality in this model, in addition to the commonly promulgated myth of separation in order to advance the possibility of public religion as a moralizing and constructive force for American democracy.
The concept of privatization assumes an inherent danger in the public manifestation of religion (2:77). It has been suggested that pluralism and diversity create an arena inhospitable to absolute truth claims and hence pluralistic and diverse societies force religion to the private sphere. Privatization is a traditional and foundational tenet of secularity. Privatization was conceived of as the protection of individual and religious liberties, as well as a defence against the divisiveness of personal conscience and conviction. Secularity and, implicitly, the private practice of religion are commonly held as the characteristic attributes of modernity and a developed democracy. Clearly, the orientation of society around a single religious tradition or belief has become untenable. Thiemann claims however that while this is true – that one religious belief may not dominate a group – it does not explicitly portend the privatization, and surely not the extinction, of religion (2:78).
As such, Thiemann refutes the benefit of privatization for pluralistic societies, claiming that in fact, the privatization of beliefs and convictions leads to “an atrophy of citizenship” (1:152). It is in public associations, he suggests, that we often acquire our deepest convictions and simultaneously develop a sense of responsibility. Public associations cultivate virtues outside of the governmental realm and encourage purpose and personal accountability in citizenship. The atrophy of citizenship stems from the proscription against the public manifestation of conscience and the relegation of non-governmental public and civic activities as private (1:152). Thiemann hence advocates a thriving and integrated civic enterprise in which modes of thought – including religious ones – are developed and articulated outside of government. Concern for the continued persistence and effectiveness of civic associations, he states, should predominate if we have a real interest in liberty (1:153).
The prohibition against public religion and the persistent myth of separation is a contradiction of a lived reality, Thiemann notes, attesting to the effectiveness of leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr, and pointing to various examples of large scale mobilization of Americans on religious grounds, such as the civil rights movement (2”79). He further makes the compelling claim that the “separation of church and state” is not a concept located in or attributable to the First Amendment. Neither religion, nor the state should assert authority over the other, but they should be engaged in a dialectic, the wall between them being impermeable, not impregnable (2:82). In fact, he argues, the virtues of liberty, equality, and tolerance have been neglected in the adjudication of First Amendment cases in the Supreme Court in favour of a tendency towards maintaining “separation” at all cost. These values, should they provide guidance in adjudication, would enhance our understanding of possible contributions from people and communities of faith (2:82).
These two assertions, critical of privatization and separation, provide the impetus for Thiemann’s suggestion that public religion be considered as a positive and rejuvenating agent in face of this perceived moral degeneracy. His call for the revitalization of discourse, responsibility, participation, and ethical integrity is one that appeals to the sensitivities and desires of a diverse ideological demographic who share similar concerns but who may not see religion as the panacea Thiemann sets it up to be. This considered, his petition does have a considerable universal appeal in that the proposed outcomes are of a common intrinsic worth to those in a democratic and diverse polity.
However, the question that rests at the forefront of everyone’s mind when confronted with the possibility of a more influential or public role of religion, is to what extent public religion is a positive rather than a completely divisive force in the fortification of a cohesive national identity premised on shared values? To this end, how do we navigate non-negotiable truths and how does the absoluteness of faith engender productive dialogue? Furthermore, what assurance do we have that a recasting of religion in the public domain will not concretize or formalize fragmentary units with opposing objectives? Finally, what avenues are available, considering these diverse and opposing orientations, to nurture pluralist citizenry? Thiemann offers two types of responses to this problem: the first is founded in democratic and liberal theory, while the second is predominantly theological.
First, Thiemann states that American national identity has been “established through the tradition of democratic debate concerning the core values of our polity”(1:148) . This notion suggests that only through the surfacing of our deepest loyalties, the uncovering of our individual, but potentially overlapping, spheres of conviction, and the entering into of debate with our interlocutors, may we achieve and sustain “the robustness of democracy”(1:148) central to American national identity. In this line of reasoning, Thiemann further states that “rational justification and persuasion” are at the heart of democratic process (1:125). A prohibition against the employment of personal convictions for justification of the common good in public discourse completely undermines the notion that we may persuade others, non-coercively and rationally, in establishing the nation’s core values.
Second, Thiemann makes a strictly theological argument for pluralist citizenship, which considers the notion of inhabiting different and conflicting worlds of meaning, presumably aimed at those considering how to both affirm religious convictions and simultaneously acknowledge the different beliefs of others. He calls Christians particularly to find a resolution in what he calls “pilgrim citizenship” which emphasizes that the public realm is not the final or ultimate place for fulfillment, but is one they must navigate and negotiate within for a time (2:84). He argues that engaging in debate does not delegitimize one’s own truth nor does it entail moral relativism; pluralism solicits us to accept the positions of others without endorsing them (2:85). Thiemann goes on to note that faith is not a belief or impression of certainty, but rather, faith is placed in the unknown. Christians are implored to accept that knowledge of God is always inadequate, which does not support an impulse towards absoluteness. Thiemann further employs in his advocacy of pluralism the concept of “faith seeking understanding” as a guiding principle for encountering the beliefs of others and for the propagation of tolerance (2:86).
Thiemann’s main concern appears to be with the development of civic virtues. This becomes increasingly apparent in his explicitly theological pieces in which he advocates a greater relationship between civic and religious duties, calling on Christians to engage in the mission of healing in the world. Political citizenship, responsibility to others, ministry of justice, and the pursuit of moral integrity, he claims, are necessitated by man’s covenant with God (3). He acknowledges the possibility of virtues stemming from a variety of sources other than religion, but not to its exclusion. In his work, he problematizes the notion of separation of church and state and of the privatization of religion for the development and vitality of civic character and citizenship. Thiemann is particularly concerned with fostering a healthy and vigorous moral milieu in which policy is formed. Without honest interaction and deep personal and philosophical engagement with others leading to rational persuasive argumentation we are faced with a lacklustre, not to mention highly volatile, social and civic environment not at all conducive to ethically charged policy formation. Pluralist citizenship is in the best interest of the religious and non-religious, and Thiemann makes a convincing argument for why the consideration of public religious voices and communities could greatly enhance, revitalize, and reignite a widespread commitment to civic virtues.
1. Thiemann, Ronald. Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy.Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press (1996).
2. Thiemann, Ronald. “Public Religion: Bane or Blessing for Democracy”. In, Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith. Ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2000).
3. Thiemann, Ronald. Constructing a Public Theology: The Church in a Pluralistic Culture. Louisville, KT: Westminster/John Knox Press (1991).
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A Return From Exile 
Posted on April 23, 2010
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